Benjamin's famous description of the aura in the `Small History of Photography' starts: `What is aura? A strange texture of space and time...', and ends with: `That means breathing the aura of these mountains and this branch'. Until now, the meaning of `breathing' has hardly been subject to interpretation. In this article it will be shown that Benjamin refers to Goethe's `diastole/systole', and to Hölderlin's concept of the unity of antagonistic dispositions, for example the paradoxical constellation of the sacred/sobriety ( (...) das `heilig nüchterne'). To Benjamin `breathing' means the original, prehistorical, situation of harmony and peace. Together with the decline of bourgeois society, parallel to the development of a new technology in photography and film, the aura disappears. In its place we find the dialectical image ( `dialektisches Bild'). Benjamin tries to show that the decline of the aura is not just some aesthetic question, but that it is connected to the traditional philosophical problem of defining the truth and the relation between myth and rationality. Referring to Benjamin's cosmological speculations, as well as to his references to Baudelaire, it can be argued that, notwithstanding his lyrical description of the aura, Benjamin was in favour of the destruction of the aura. Under the conditions of a capitalist economy and a malfunctioning republic, a society which can be defined as `false', the traditional idea of aura, being the `shine' of a true society, cannot be taken for granted. The `dialectical image', showing that antagonistic forces hide behind a `shine' of unity and harmony, enables us to see that the traditional idea of truth is obsolete and to look for a new solution. (shrink)

INTRODUCTION There is no doubt that "subjectivity" is one of the central issues of twentieth century philosophy and art. At the beginning of the century ...

Zwischen 1934 und 1939 war die Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung für Walter Benjamin die zuverlässigste Publikationsmöglichkeit. Auch finanziell war Benjamin von der, vom ´Institut für Sozialforschung herausgegebenen, Zeitschrift abhängig. Zwei seiner wichtigsten Essays, L´oeuvre d´art à l´époque de sa reproduction mécanisée , Über einige Motive bei Baudelaire und vier weitere Beiträge erschienen in der Zeitschrift.Um die ersten beiden Texte entwickelten sich zwischen Adorno, der als Sachwalter der Redaktion auftrat, teilweise Horkheimer einerseits und Benjamin anderseits äußerst heftige Kontroversen. Es ging dabei nicht (...) nur darum, inwiefern marxistische Optionen unverhüllt ausgesprochen werden durften, sondern vor allem um systematische Fragen, die zwischen Adorno und Benjamin strittig waren und blieben. Mehr als die veröffentlichten Essays der beiden gibt der Briefwechsel zwischen Adorno und Benjamin überraschende Aufschlüsse über die tiefer liegenden, kontroversen Konzepte von Dialektik und anthropologischem Materialismus. (shrink)

In three experiments, picture quality between test items was manipulated to examine whether subjects’ expectations about the fluency normally associated with these different stimuli might influence the effects of fluency on preference or familiarity-based recognition responses. The results showed that fluency due to pre-exposure influenced responses less when objects were presented with high picture quality, suggesting that attributions of fluency to preference and familiarity are adjusted according to expectations about the different test pictures. However, this expectations influence depended on subjects’ (...) awareness of these different quality levels. Indeed, imperceptible differences seemed not to induce expectations about the test item fluency. In this context, fluency due to both picture quality and pre-exposure influenced direct responses. Conversely, obvious, and noticed, differences in test picture quality did no affect responses, suggesting that expectations moderated attributions of fluency only when fluency normally associated with these different stimuli was perceptible but difficult to assess. (shrink)

Notwithstanding its overwhelming descriptive power for existing data, it is not clear whether the kinematic theory of Plamondon & Alimi could generate new insights into biomechanical constraints and psychological processes underlying the way organisms trade off speed for accuracy. The kinematic model should elaborate on the role of neuromotor noise and on biomechanical strategies for reducing endpoint variability related to such noise.

To prevent ordinary people from being harmed by natural language processing (NLP) technology, finding ways to measure the extent to which a language model is biased (e.g., regarding gender) has become an active area of research. One popular class of NLP bias measures are bias benchmark datasets—collections of test items that are meant to assess a language model’s preference for stereotypical versus non-stereotypical language. In this paper, we argue that such bias benchmarks should be assessed with models from the psychometric (...) framework of item response theory (IRT). Specifically, we tie an introduction to basic IRT concepts and models with a discussion of how they could be relevant to the evaluation, interpretation and improvement of bias benchmark datasets. Regarding evaluation, IRT provides us with methodological tools for assessing the quality of both individual test items (e.g., the extent to which an item can differentiate highly biased from less biased language models) as well as benchmarks as a whole (e.g., the extent to which the benchmark allows us to assess not only severe but also subtle levels of model bias). Through such diagnostic tools, the quality of benchmark datasets could be improved, for example by deleting or reworking poorly performing items. Finally, in regards to interpretation, we argue that IRT models’ estimates for language model bias are conceptually superior to traditional accuracy-based evaluation metrics, as the former take into account more information than just whether or not a language model provided a biased response. (shrink)

The concept of meaningful work is used to evaluate the quality of work. Typical cases of meaningless work that have been used to clarify this concept are assembly line work, and work involving other types of mindless tasks, but also David Graeber's ‘bullshit jobs’. I argue that there are at least two fundamental reasons to care about meaningful work: reasons from the wellbeing of the worker and reasons pertaining to meaningfulness of the worker's life. I first argue that a concept (...) of meaningful work needs to reflect these two values, but that these two values may come apart. Because of this, accounts that provide a single answer to the question to what extent a particular work context is meaningful work for a particular worker are unable to reflect these two values. I then survey three promising accounts of meaningful work: perfectionism, which captures the self-interested aspect of meaningful work well but fails to capture the meaningfulness aspect appropriately; consequentialism, which captures the meaningfulness aspect well but fails to capture the self-interested aspect; and Wolf's Fitting Fulfilment View of meaningful projects, which can be read as addressing both concerns but leads to implausible judgments about meaningful work. I then argue that we should conceive of the concerns that fall under the notion of meaningful work as two separate concepts and values. The best work incorporates both these dimensions but falling short on either dimension is problematic for different reasons. (shrink)

The concept of well-being is increasingly gaining acceptance as an object of science, and many different types of well-being measures have been developed. A debate has emerged about which measures are able to capture well-being successfully. An important underlying problem is that there is no unified conceptual framework about the nature of well-being—a hotly debated topic of philosophical discussion. I argue that while there is little agreement about the nature of well-being in philosophy, there is an important agreement on some (...) important principles relevant for its measurement. I argue that well-being science has good reasons to accommodate these principles, but currently fails to do so. (shrink)

An increasing number of older patients have to decide on a treatment plan for advanced chronic kidney disease, involving dialysis or conservative care. Shared decision-making is recommended as the model for decision-making in such preference-sensitive decisions. The aim of SDM is to come to decisions that are consistent with the patient’s values and preferences and made by the patient and healthcare professional working together. In clinical practice, however, SDM appears to be not yet routine and needs further implementation. A shift (...) from a biomedical to a person-centered conception might help to make the process more shared. Shared should, therefore, be interpreted as two persons bringing two perspectives to the table, that both need to be explored during the decision-making process. Starting from the patient’s perspective will enable to determine the mutual goals of care first and, subsequently, determine the best way for achieving those goals. To perform such SDM, the healthcare professional needs to become a skilled companion, being part of the patient’s relational context, and start asking the right questions about what matters to the patient as person. In this article, we describe the need for a person-centered conception of SDM for the setting of older patients with advanced CKD. (shrink)

Many global problems nowadays are collective action problems. It is only because many people act in some way that certain problems arise (e.g., climate harms). But when can one be said to participate in such groups in the first place? As Derek Parfit asked, “When we appeal to what groups together do, whom should we count as members of these groups?” As Julia Nefsky has shown, this problem has proven to be notoriously tricky, and without any adequate solution. We present (...) a solution. The proposed account not only overcomes a number of problems for participation-based views, according to which it is morally problematic to participate in such groups at all, but also helps make precise a prominent alternative view, according to which one should help bring about better outcomes. (shrink)

Can a person’s degree of wellbeing be affected by things that do not enter her experience? Experientialists deny that it can, extra-experientialists affirm it. The debate between these two positions has focused on an argument against experientialism—the experience machine objection—but few arguments exist for it. I present an argument for experientialism. It builds on the claim that theories of wellbeing should not only state what constitutes wellbeing, but also which entities are welfare subjects. Moreover, the claims it makes about these (...) two issues should have a certain coherence with each other. I argue that if we accept a particular plausible answer to the second question—namely that all and only sentient beings are welfare subjects—extra-experientialist theories face a problem of coherence. While this problem can typically be solved, doing so will involve steps that are unattractive. On experientialist theories, on the other hand, the answer to these questions cohere perfectly. (shrink)

Wellbeing describes how good life is for the person living it. Wellbeing comes in degrees. Subjective theories of wellbeing maintain that for objects or states of affairs to benefit us, we need to have a positive attitude towards these objects or states of affairs: the Resonance Constraint. In this article, we investigate to what extent subjectivism can plausibly account for degrees of wellbeing. There is a vast literature on whether preference-satisfaction theory – one particular subjective theory – can account for (...) degrees of wellbeing. This is generally taken to be problematic. However, other subjective theories – namely, desire-satisfaction, judgment- and value-fulfillment theories – do not suffer from the same difficulties. We introduce two models of degrees of wellbeing a subjectivist can employ: the Relative and the Absolute Model, and defend the claim that both models face difficulties. In particular, we argue that a subjectivist theory should describe instances of depression as instances of low degrees of wellbeing. We also argue that a reduction of desires may sometimes improve one’s degree of wellbeing, an idea we call the Epicurean Intuition. We then argue that the Relative Model fails to account for the disbenefit of certain types of depression, while the Absolute Model fails to meet a central commitment of subjectivism – the Resonance Constraint – and is unable to accommodate the Epicurean Intuition. The upshot of the paper is that subjectivist theories cannot account for degrees of well-being in a plausible way. (shrink)

Normative ethics is concerned with reflection on moral problems. It does so through the analysis of moral reasons. In this chapter we explain what a moral problem is, why some moral problems should be classified as problems of will, some as cognitive problems, and describe the difference between motivations and reasons. The chapter then provides an overview of three types of moral reasons: (1) reasons that derive from the consequences of our actions, (2) reasons that concern the acts themselves (principles), (...) and (3) reasons that concern our own character (virtues). To arrive at a moral judgments, these reasons need to be weighed, which requires making an ethical judgment. (shrink)